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FISA AMENDMENTS ACT 2008:
PROTECTING AMERICANS BY
MONITORING INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNICATIONS; IS IT REASONABLE?
Jessica LoConte
“Those who can give up an essential liberty to obtain a little
temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety.”
– Benjamin Franklin, Memoirs of the Life and Writings of
Benjamin Franklin

INTRODUCTION
On July 10, 2008, President George W. Bush signed the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments
Acts of 2008 (FAA) into law. Days later, from the Rose Garden
at the White House, he stated that the new law “will allow our
intelligence professionals to quickly and effectively monitor the
communications of terrorists abroad, while respecting the
liberties of Americans here at home.” 1 If only it were that
1 Presidential Remarks on Signing the FISA Amendments Act of 2008,
PUB. PAPERS 975 (July 14, 2008), available at http://www.presidential
rhetoric.com/speeches/07.10.08.html.
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simple, there would surely be less controversy surrounding the
federal government’s current surveillance practices.
Undeniably, the government has a responsibility to prevent
terrorist attacks, but the problem posed by FAA is that it
allows for far greater governmental intrusion into the private
communications of law-abiding Americans rather than
effectively monitoring the communications among terrorists.
Specifically, the Fourth Amendment has long guarded the
right of every American to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures of their property by government officials. This
begs the question of whether the FAA provides reasonable
means of guarding the safety of our Nation. Depending on who
is asked, the answer to the question will be strikingly different.
Former President Bush justified the new expansive surveillance program by delivering a dire warning to the American
people, stating that just because “the terrorists have failed to
strike our shores again [since 9/11,] [it] does not mean that our
enemies have given up.” 2 Moreover, Bush “vowed to do
everything in [his] power to prevent another attack on our
Nation.” 3 Because President Barack Obama signed the FAA
while he was a Senator, one can assume that he also believes
the current surveillance program provides reasonable means to
ensure the safety of the American people. 4 Accordingly, the
United States’ current surveillance practices under the FAA
are likely to remain in effect until 2012. 5
On the other hand, many Americans believe that this
legislation is too intrusive, even if it was enacted in the name
of national security. Senator Russ Feingold remarked, before
the passage of the FAA, that the Act authorizes “the
government to collect all communications between the U.S. and
the rest of the world.” 6 This could ultimately “mean millions
upon millions of communications between innocent Americans
Id.
Id.
4 Nat Hentoff, Op-Ed., The Fourth Amendment Discarded, WASH. TIMES,
Jan. 26, 2009, at A19.
5 The Act has a sunset provision. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, § 403(b)(1), 122 Stat.
2436 (2008).
6 Press Release, Congressional Press Releases, Remarks of U.S. Senator
Russ Feingold in Opposition to the FISA Amendments Act (July 9, 2008).
2
3
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and their friends, families, or business associates overseas
could legally be collected. Parents calling their kids studying
abroad, emails to friends serving in Iraq – all of these communications could be collected, with absolutely no suspicion of any
wrongdoing.” 7 Senator Feingold is not alone in his opposition
to the current surveillance program—many civil libertarians
find the FAA incompatible with a free society. In response, the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed a lawsuit in the
Southern District of New York on July 10, 2008, just hours
after the FAA went into effect. The lawsuit, Amnesty v.
McConnell, 8 challenges the constitutionality of section 702 of
the FAA, and asks the court to issue a permanent injunction
that would prevent the federal government from engaging in
its current international surveillance practices. 9
This note analyzes the FAA in light of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence and international privacy standards adopted by
other nations. The note argues that surveillance, conducted in
the manner authorized under the FAA, does not comport with
the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment
because the government can intercept potentially all international communications without any requirement that surveillance is targeted at individuals suspected of wrongdoing.
The Supreme Court has balanced individual privacy rights
with the government’s need to protect the public numerous
times, and never has the Court upheld a measure that invaded
the privacy of so many law-abiding persons who had no
connection to illegal conduct.
Such dragnet surveillance
techniques are not only fundamentally un-American, but are
also in sharp contrast to how other countries have decided to
strike the balance between individual privacy and national
security.
Part I provides a background on section 702 of the FAA
and highlights the controversy surrounding the Act by focusing
on Amnesty v. McConnell. 10 Part II provides a very brief
Id.
No. 08 Civ. 6259 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2008), available at http://www.
aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/faa_complaint_20080710.pdf.
9 Complaint §§ 108-10, at 42, Amnesty v. McConnell, No. 08 Civ. 6259
(S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2008).
10 Id.
7
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summary of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, as interpreted
by the Supreme Court, and its application in the national
security context followed by an analysis of the FAA’s
constitutionality, in light of Supreme Court decisions. Part III
discusses international standards relating to government
surveillance practices with a detailed discussion of the latest
decision issued by the European Court of Human Rights in the
case of Liberty v. United Kingdom. This section is developed
through an analysis of the FAA pursuant to the international
standards set out in Liberty. Part IV proposes that while
national security is an important government objective, it is
also imperative to protect the freedom of U.S persons to
communicate privately with non U.S. citizens located abroad.
The current surveillance program under the FAA not only
poses serious constitutional questions, but it is also
incompatible with current international practice.
I.

A.

SECTION 702 OF THE FAA AND AMNESTY ET AL. V.
MCCONNELL

Background on Section 702 of the FAA

Section 702 of the FAA grants authority to the Attorney
General of the United States and the Director of National
Intelligence (DNI) to jointly authorize surveillance of any
individual reasonably believed to be located outside the borders
of the United States, so long as that person is not a United
States person, 11 in order to acquire foreign intelligence
information. 12 Federal government officials do not attempt to
circumvent the restriction on targeting only non-U.S. persons
who are located outside the United States’ borders because
section 702 prevents the government from intentionally
11 A “United States person” is defined as “a citizen of the United States,
an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence (as defined in Section
1101(a)(20) of Title 8), an unincorporated association a substantial number of
members of which are citizens of the United States or aliens lawfully
admitted for permanent residence, or a corporation which is incorporated in
the United States, but does not include a corporation or an association which
is a foreign power, as defined in subsection (a)(1), (2), or (3) of this section. 50
U.S.C. § 1801(i)(2008).
12 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, supra note 5, § 702(a).
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targeting a person located outside the United States if the
primary purpose of such surveillance is to obtain information
about a person located within the United States. 13 It is also
important to remember that the FAA only authorizes the
surveillance of foreign nationals who are located outside of the
United States’ borders.
Pursuant to section 702, the
government cannot intentionally target a United States person
no matter where they are located. 14
In order to conduct surveillance, the Attorney General and
the DNI must provide to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court 15 a written certification attesting that:
(1) Targeting limitations have been followed; 16
(2) There are procedures in place that have been approved by
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court that are reasonably
designed to “(I) ensure that an acquisition . . . is limited to
targeting persons reasonably believed to be located outside the
United States; and (II) prevent the intentional acquisition of
any communication as to which the sender and all intended
recipients are known at the time of the acquisition to be located
in the United States;” 17
(3) Minimization procedures will be used “to minimize the
acquisition and retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of
nonpublicly available information concerning unconsenting
United States persons;” 18
(4) “A significant purpose of the acquisition is to obtain foreign

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, supra note 5, § 702(b)(2).
Id. § 702(b)(3).
15 “The FISC consists of seven United States district court judges
designated by the Chief Justice who meet in secret and are empowered ‘to
hear applications for and grant orders approving electronic surveillance and
physical searches anywhere within the United States under the procedures
set forth’ in FISA. Similarly, FISA authorizes [sic] a three-judge appellate
panel, designated by the Chief Justice. This special Court of Appeals consists
of three district or court of appeals judges who hear appeals by the
government when its applications are denied. From this panel decision, the
government may appeal to the Supreme Court.” William C. Banks & M.E.
Bowman, Executive Authority for National Security Surveillance, 50 AM. U.L.
REV. 1, 81-82 (2000).
16 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, supra note 5, § 702(g)(2)(A)(vii).
17 Id. § 702(g)(2)(A)(i)(I)-(II).
18 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(1) (2008).
13
14
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intelligence information;” 19 and
(5) The procedures used are consistent with the Fourth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. 20

If the FISC finds that the above requirements are met, then it
will issue a warrant. 21
Note that in order to obtain a warrant from the FISA
court, it is not necessary for the Attorney General or the DNI to
specify who the target of surveillance will be. In fact, the
statute specifically states that any “certification made under
this subsection [section 702] is not required to identify the
specific facilities, places, premises or property at which an
acquisition . . . will be directed or conducted.” 22 Nor does the
statute state that the government must have a reasonable
belief that the targets of surveillance have a connection to
criminal or terrorist activities. Although section 702 requires
the government to adopt minimization procedures, the FISC is
not provided with any details regarding the specific
minimization procedures to be implemented, which limits the
court’s review of the ways in which intelligence agencies will
use the intercepted intelligence data in the future.
Another provision that causes concern is section
702(g)(1)(B) of the FAA, which provides a temporary exception
to the warrant requirement: surveillance may begin under the
authority of the Attorney General and DNI without court
authorization if “time does not permit the submission of a
certification.” 23 However, certification must be made to the
Court no later than seven days after surveillance has
Lastly, section 702(i)(4)(B) allows the
commenced. 24
government to continue the surveillance practices, that the
FISC found to be unlawful, while awaiting a decision from the
Court of Review. 25

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, supra note 5, § 702(g)(2)(A)(v).
Id. § 702(g)(2)(A)(iv).
Id. § 702(i)(3)(A).
Id. § 702(g)(4).
Id. § 702(g)(1)(B).
Id.
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, supra note 5, § 702(i)(4)(B).
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B. Amnesty v. McConnell: A Case About the Constitutionality
of Section 702 of the FAA
1)

The Facts and Procedural Posture of Amnesty v. McConnell

Just hours after the FAA became law, the ACLU filed
Amnesty v. McConnell in U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York on behalf of human rights organizations, 26
an international labor union, 27 journalists, 28 and defense
attorneys, 29 all of whom allegedly rely on the ability to engage
in confidential communications with individuals abroad in
fulfillment of their professional obligations. 30 The defendants
to this suit are the Director of National Intelligence, 31 the
director of the National Security Agency, 32 and the Attorney
General of the United States. 33 The plaintiffs filed a Motion in
Support of Summary Judgment, the defendants replied with a
Motion in Opposition to Summary Judgment; as of the date of
this writing, the district court judge has not ruled on the
motion.

26 Amnesty International USA, Global Fund of Women, Global Rights,
Human Rights Watch, the International Criminal Defence Attorneys
Association, the Washington Office on Latin America, and PEN American
Center. Complaint, Amnesty v. McConnell, No. 08 Civ. 6259 (S.D.N.Y. July
10, 2008), available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/faa_complaint
_20080710.pdf.
27 The international labor union referred to is the Service Employee
International Union. Id.
28 The Nation Magazine sues on behalf of itself and its contributing
journalists Naomi Klein and Chris Hedges. Id. §§ 80, at 29.
29 Attorneys Daniel N. Arshack, David Nevin, Scott McKay, Sylvia
Royce. Complaint, Amnesty v. McConnell, No. 08 Civ. 6259 (S.D.N.Y. July 10,
2008), available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/faa_complaint_2008
0710.pdf.
30 ACLU Sues over Unconstitutional Dragnet Wiretapping Law, STATES
NEWS SERVICE, July 10, 2008, available at http://www.aclu-mn.org/home/
news/aclusuesoverunconstitution.htm.
31 Amnesty v. McConnell, No. 08 Civ. 6259 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2008)
(John M. McConnell, at the time of filing).
32 Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander, at the time of filing. Id.
33 Michael B. Mukasey, at the time of filing. Id.
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2) The ACLU’s Argument that Section 702 is
Unconstitutional
The ACLU argues that the FAA violates the Fourth
Amendment, the First Amendment, 34 and Article III; however,
for the purposes of this paper, I will focus on the ACLU’s
Fourth Amendment argument. The ACLU’s primary concern
with the new law is that the Act provides a means for the
government to engage in “dragnet surveillance tactics” 35
because it expressly states that the government is not required
to identify the facilities, telephone lines, e-mail addresses,
places, premises, or property at which its surveillance will be
directed in order to obtain a certified warrant from the FISA
court. 36
According to the ACLU, the lack of specificity in the
surveillance warrant resembles “general warrants” that were
issued by the English government which the Framer’s
specifically had in mind while drafting the Fourth Amendment
and purposely meant to exclude because they lead to abuses of
power by the State. 37 The ACLU argues that while the old
FISA statute “generally foreclosed the government from
engaging in ‘electronic surveillance’ without first obtaining an
individualized and particularized order from the FISC,” 38
under the new amendment:
[T]he government may obtain a mass acquisition order
without identifying the people (or even the group of people)
to be surveilled; without specifying the facilities, places,
premises, or property to be monitored; without specifying the
particular communications to be collected; without obtaining

34 The ACLU argues that the FAA violates the First Amendment
“because it sweeps within its ambit constitutionally protected speech that the
government has no legitimate interest in acquiring and because it fails to
provide adequate procedural safeguards. Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support
of Motion for Summary Judgment at 3, Amnesty v. McConnell, No. 08 Civ.
6259 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2008), available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/
amnesty_v_mcconnell_memosupportingsummaryjudgement.pdf.
35 Id. at 1, 17, 21, 28, 41.
36 Id. at 9 (referring to §702(g)(4)).
37 Id. at 26.
38 Complaint at 9, Amnesty v. McConnell, No. 08 Civ. 6259 (S.D.N.Y.
filed July 10, 2008) (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(2006)).
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individualized warrants based on criminal or foreign
intelligence probable cause; and without making even a prior
administrative determination that the acquisition relates to
a particular foreign agent or foreign power. A single mass
acquisition order may be used to justify the surveillance of
communications implicating thousands or even millions of
U.S. citizens and residents. 39

The ACLU argues that through the use of mass acquisition
orders issued by the FISA Court, the interception of
communications by the executive branch violates both the
Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment and the
requirement of reasonableness. The ALCU argues that the
Warrant Clause is violated because the FISC issues warrants
without requiring the government to define either the location
or the persons who will subject to surveillance. Second, the
ACLU argues that even if the FAA surveillance practices do
not violate the Warrant Clause, the FAA allows the
government to engage in dragnet wiretapping tactics, which
the Supreme Court has deemed to be unconstitutional on
numerous occasions.
The ACLU also objects that the FAA does not explicitly
state the minimization procedures that the government is
bound to adopt under the statute, nor does it provide for
adequate judicial oversight over the minimization procedures
to be implemented by the executive branch. As a result of the
FAA’s failure to “place meaningful limits on the government’s
retention analysis, and dissemination of information that
relates to U.S. citizens,” large government databases can be

39 Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
at 9, Amnesty v. McConnell, No. 08 Civ. 6259 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2008). The
ACLU warns that the FAA creates the potential for the executive branch to
intercept: “All telephone and e-mail communications to and from countries of
foreign policy interest for example, Russia, Venezuela, or Israel – including
communications made to and from U.S. citizens and residents. All telephone
and e-mail communications to and from the leaders of the Pakistani lawyers’
movement for democracy, with the specific purpose of learning whether those
leaders are sharing information with American journalists and, if so, what
information is being shared and with which journalists. All of the
communications of European attorneys who work with American attorneys
on behalf of prisoners held at Guantánamo, including communications in
which the two sets of attorneys share information about their clients and
strategize about litigation.” Id. at 1-2.
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created through the mass acquisition of international
communications, and in the future those databases can be
searched in order to find information about specific U.S.
persons. 40
3)

The Government’s Response in Defense of Section 702

The government’s first argument is that the plaintiff lacks
standing to file this suit; 41 for the purposes of this paper,
however, I will assume that standing is proper and discuss the
government’s substantive arguments. The government argues
that the FAA does not violate the Fourth Amendment because
the surveillance authorized under the statute targets foreign
persons who are located abroad, people who do not enjoy
constitutional rights and protections. 42 The government urges
the Court to assume that the surveillance agencies act in
accordance with the targeting procedures specified in the FAA
and do not engage in any type of reverse targeting of U.S.
persons. The Government goes on to argue that when the
communications of U.S. persons are collected incidental to
surveillance targeted at foreign powers, a foreign intelligence
exception to the Warrant Clause applies. 43
The Government admits that because privacy interests of
U.S. persons are implicated, the FAA must comply with the
Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement, as the
“underlying command of the Fourth Amendment is always that
The government
searches and seizures be reasonable.” 44
argues that the FAA is reasonable because it provides the
government with information regarding foreign threats to
national security while protecting the privacy interests of U.S.
persons who communicate with foreigners located abroad by
requiring the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to review
all certifications for governmental compliance to the targeting
40 Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment,
supra note 39, at 20.
41 Defendant’s Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment at 17,
Amnesty v. McConnell, No. 08 Civ. 6259 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2008), available
at http://www.aclu.org/images/nsaspying/asset_upload_file531_37629.pdf.
42 Id. at 34.
43 Id. at 40.
44 Id. at 33.
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procedures and minimization procedures laid out in FAA. 45
The Government argues that requiring a warrant to be based
on “individualized suspicion,” which requires “identification of
the persons, facilities, and communications to be surveilled,” 46
would place an unreasonable burden on intelligence gathering
agencies and “impose a back-door warrant requirement” to
international surveillance that is not necessary when the
targets of surveillance are foreign powers located abroad. 47
The government asserts that any constitutionally protected
privacy interests that the plaintiffs have in their
communications are adequately protected ex post through
minimization procedures. 48
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONTEXT, KEITH,
AND THE FAA
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 49

The framers of the Constitution were familiar with the
horrible invasion of privacy that the English “general
warrants” allowed, and they wished to prevent a similar abuse
of power by the United States government when they ratified
the Fourth Amendment. 50
At first, the Supreme Court
required an actual trespass in order to establish that one’s
Fourth Amendment rights were violated by an unlawful search
and seizure. 51 In time, however, in order to keep pace with

Id. at 48-49.
Defendant’s Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment at 53,
Amnesty v. McConnell, No. 08 Civ. 6259 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2008), available
at http://www.aclu.org/images/nsaspying/asset_upload_file531_37629.pdf.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 39.
49 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
50 William C. Banks & M.E. Bowman, Executive Authority for National
Security Surveillance, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2000).
51 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928).
45
46
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modern technology, the Supreme Court extended Fourth
Amendment protection to electronic surveillance in Katz v.
United States. 52 While Katz is the seminal United States case
discussing personal privacy rights in communications, like
most Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, it focuses on an
American individual’s privacy rights in a criminal investigation
rather than in the national security context. Because the
“requirements for obtaining surveillance authority for the two
threats are fundamentally distinct . . . [t]he Fourth
Amendment cannot, and does not, provide even-handed
guidance” 53 for assessing the constitutionality of a surveillance
program such as the FAA.
A) Keith and National Security
The only Supreme Court case that deals with an
individual’s Fourth Amendment rights in a national security
matter is United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith). 54 In Keith,
the Supreme Court addressed whether the Fourth Amendment
required a neutral magistrate to issue a warrant prior to the
executive branch commencing domestic surveillance for the
purposes of national security. 55 According to the Court, “[t]he
determination of this question requires the essential Fourth
Amendment inquiry into the ‘reasonableness’ of the search and
seizure in question, and the way in which that ‘reasonableness’
derives content and meaning through reference to the Warrant
Clause.” 56 Recognizing that “the Fourth Amendment is not
absolute in its terms,” the Supreme Court balanced “the duty of
the Government to protect the domestic security, and the
potential danger posed by unreasonable surveillance to
individual privacy and free expression.” 57 The Supreme Court

52 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
The Katz decision
“implicitly recognized that the broad and unsuspected governmental
incursions into conversational privacy which electronic surveillance entails
necessitate the application of Fourth Amendment safeguards.” United States
v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith) 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972).
53 Banks & Bowman, supra note 50, at 9.
54 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972).
55 Id. at 309.
56 Id. at 309-10 (emphasis added).
57 Id. at 314-15 (emphasis added).
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reasoned that “Fourth Amendment freedoms cannot properly
be guaranteed if domestic security surveillances may be
conducted solely within the discretion of the Executive Branch.
The Fourth Amendment does not contemplate that the
executive officers of Government will act as neutral and
disinterested magistrates.” 58 Therefore, the Supreme Court
declined to create a national security exception to the warrant
requirement 59 and held that, in the case of domestic
surveillance, even if surveillance is conducted in the interests
of national security, prior judicial review was required in order
for electronic surveillance to comport with the constitutional
requirements under the Fourth Amendment. 60 The Supreme
Court also made clear that the Keith decision pertained only to
domestic surveillance programs, and did not address the
question of whether the President has authority to conduct
warrantless surveillance of foreign powers. 61
B) Surveillance Must Always Comport with the
Reasonableness Requirement
In Keith, the Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged that
the requirements to obtain a warrant could be different in the
national security context, 62 as the “exact targets of such
surveillance may be more difficult to identify than in
surveillance operations against many types of crime,” 63 yet
regardless of whether the purpose of surveillance is for
criminal investigation or to collect intelligence information, the
use of electronic surveillance by the government always risks
infringing on “constitutionally protected privacy of speech.” 64
Therefore, the test of whether electronic surveillance conducted
in the interests of national security comports with the
Id. at 316-17 (emphasis added).
Id. at 320.
60 Keith, 407 U.S. at 324.
61 Id. at 321-22 (stating: “[T]his case involves only the domestic aspects
of national security. We have not addressed, and expressed no opinion as to,
the issues which may be involved with respect to activities of foreign powers
of their agents.”).
62 Id. at 322-23.
63 Id. at 322.
64 Id. at 320.
58
59
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requirements of the Fourth Amendment is whether the
surveillance is “reasonable both in relation to the legitimate
need of Government for intelligence information and the
protected rights of our citizens.” 65
Later decisions by the Supreme Court assessing the
reasonableness of searches not based on suspicion have upheld
statutes and regulations that invaded individual privacy where
there was a legitimate government interest in public safety.
Recently, in Samson v. California, the Supreme Court upheld a
California statute that subjected all parolees to agree to be
subject to a search or seizure without a search warrant and
without any cause as a condition of their release. 66 The
Supreme Court noted that such invasion of privacy of lawabiding citizens would not otherwise be tolerated under the
Fourth Amendment. In 1995, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of a school policy whereby all high school
students who wished to play sports needed to consent to
random drug tests not based on suspicion. 67 And, in 1989, the
Supreme Court upheld another random drug and alcohol
testing case for railroad employees because the search was
narrow and all employees knew about the regulation. 68
C. While It Is Unclear Whether the FAA Violates the Warrant
Clause, the FAA Violates the Reasonableness Clause of the
Fourth Amendment
A full discussion on whether the FAA violates the Warrant
Clause of the Fourth Amendment is outside the scope of this
note.
However, in light of the Supreme Court’s
acknowledgement that Congress has the authority to relax the
traditional warrant requirements in the case of surveillance
conducted to protect national security, one can fairly assume
that a court will be reluctant to declare the FAA as
unconstitutional under the Warrant Clause. In Keith, the
government conducted domestic surveillance without a warrant
or any prior judicial approval, and this was unconstitutional
65
66
67
68

Id. at 322-23 (emphasis added).
547 U.S. 843 (2006).
Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
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according to the court, even though the surveillance was
conducted for national security purposes. However, under the
FAA, the intelligence agencies are required to obtain a warrant
from the FISC in order to conduct surveillance. And even in
the case where emergency surveillance commences without
prior judicial approval for up to a period of seven days, the
Keith opinion mentions that this would not constitute a per se
violation of the Warrant Clause in the national security
context. Accordingly, even if a court were to apply the same
standards as did the Keith Court, the requirement of judicial
oversight of executive branch surveillance under Keith is
satisfied. Therefore, it will be assumed that the FAA does not
violate the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment, and the
discussion of this note will concentrate on to the only
remaining question of whether the FAA, which allows for the
deviation from the traditional warrant requirement of
particularity and suspicion, is “reasonable both in relation to
the legitimate need of Government for intelligence information
and the protected rights of our citizens.” 69
The government insists that preventing terrorism is the
State’s most important task; therefore, the FAA is
reasonable. 70 But, this argument is conclusory and fails to
take into account the constitutionally protected privacy
interests of citizens, which the Supreme Court has articulated
must be balanced against the government’s need for
intelligence information. Here, a careful analysis of both the
necessity of surveillance information and privacy rights is
warranted.
In attempting to assess the proper balance
between privacy and security, one should keep the words of
Chief Justice Earl Warren in mind.
This concept of ‘national defense’ cannot be deemed an end
in itself, justifying any . . . power designed to promote
such a goal. Implicit in the term ‘national defense’ is the
notion of defending those values and ideas which set this
Nation apart . . . . It would indeed be ironic if, in the name

Keith, 407 U.S. at 322-23.
Defendant’s Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment at 48;
Amnesty v. McConnell, No. 08 Civ. 6259 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2008), available
at http://www.aclu.org/images/nsaspying/asset_upload_file531_37629.pdf.
69
70
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of national defense, we would sanction the subversion of . .
. those liberties . . . which [make] the defense of the Nation
worthwhile. 71

The government claims that it needs this surveillance data
in order to protect the United States from terrorist attacks.
The Supreme Court has recognized that government has a
legitimate interest in promoting the safety of its citizens, and
in the name of such safety, individual privacy rights sometimes
must be compromised. 72 However, in each case where the
Supreme Court has allowed suspicionless searches, the targets
of such searches were limited to particular group of consenting
people; in Samson, it was parolees, in Vernonia School Dist., it
was high school athletes who in the past used drugs heavily;
and in Skinner, it was railroad employees who were well aware
that they could be subjected to random drug and alcohol
screenings as part of their job.
Under the FAA, the
government is not required to show any specific suspicion of
wrongdoing, nor is the government required to certify that
there is reason to believe the targets of surveillance are
affiliated with terrorism. As the previous cases demonstrated,
searches not based on suspicion are not per se unconstitutional,
but when the scope of the FAA allows for the government to
conduct a search of all electronic communications between nonconsenting U.S. persons and non-U.S. persons located abroad,
the government surveillance program becomes a fishing
expedition.
If the FAA was enacted to help the government monitor
terrorists’ cells and hopefully prevent future terrorist attacks,
then the government should be required to certify that its
primary purpose in conducting the surveillance is to monitor
the activities of terrorists located abroad, or to collect
intelligence information that will prevent terrorist attacks on
U.S. soil.
Without any link between surveillance and
wrongdoing, the requirement of reasonableness of the Fourth
Amendment requires that the scope of suspicionless searches
71 Keith, 407 U.S. at 332 (quoting United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258
(1967) (Warren, J., concurring)).
72 See id.; see also Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006); Vernonia
School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
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be limited to a defined group of people, such as those whom the
government knows to be affiliated with terrorism. Because the
FAA does not limit surveillance to those suspected of
wrongdoing and allows the interception of practically all
communications between U.S persons and non-U.S. persons
located abroad, it violates the Fourth Amendment’s
requirement of reasonableness.
A contrary result would suggest that when the Supreme
Court decided Samson, it would have upheld a statute allowing
the state of California to conduct warrantless and suspicion
free searches of all its citizens, not just consenting parolees.
Or, when it decided Vernonia School District and Skinner, the
Court would uphold policies allowing the state to randomly
drug test any citizen regardless of consent and regardless of
any suspicion of wrongdoing. Here, the FAA allows the
government to intrude into the private conversations of all U.S.
persons who speak to non-U.S. persons abroad, who have not
consented to such searches. Because the scope of such searches
is overly broad, and is not based on any connection to
wrongdoing, surveillance authorized under the FAA is
unreasonable.
The government insists that even if the privacy rights of
Americans are violated incidentally through its surveillance
program, the minimization procedures provide an adequate
remedy for such interference.
However, the specific
minimization procedures used by the government are classified
as confidential, 73 so the people have essentially no way of
knowing if their conversations are being intercepted, overheard
and stored by the federal government. 74 To make matters
worse, there is no judicial oversight into the specific
minimization procedures that the intelligence agencies adopt
pursuant to each warrant, and so the government quite
possibly could create huge call databases, which could store the
private conversations of Americans for years into the future.
Even though the Supreme Court has confronted many
Fourth Amendment cases, none have specifically addressed the
question that is posed in Amnesty v. McConnell: is the mass

73
74

In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 728 n.16 (2002).
Hentoff, supra note 4.
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acquisition of communications data, which indirectly implicates
U.S. persons’ privacy rights, reasonable in relation to the end
goal of preventing terrorism, regardless of whether a warrant
is required in order to conduct surveillance targeted at foreign
agents? In light of the lack of case law governing this issue, 75 I
think it is helpful to take a step back and assess the current
international
standards
governing
communications
surveillance in order to gain insight into how other nations
have balanced the privacy rights of citizens versus a nation’s
need to protect its citizens from terrorism.

75 On January 12, 2009, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
released an opinion, dated August 22, 2008, where the court affirmed that
surveillance conducted in accordance with the Protect America Act of 2007
(PAA), the predecessor to FAA, does not violate either the Warrant Clause of
the Fourth Amendment or the requirement that all searches be reasonable.
The PAA, similar to the FAA, allowed the government to conduct surveillance
of foreign agents without requiring the target of surveillance to be specified.
In assessing the constitutionality of PAA, the FISC boldly stated that there is
a foreign intelligence exception to the warrant requirement, although the
Court acknowledged that the Supreme Court has never explicitly declared
that there was one. After having resolved the Warrant Clause issue, the
Court admitted that the government’s surveillance practices must comport
with the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement. Accordingly, the
Court looked to the “totality of the circumstances” to determine the degree of
intrusion into privacy the Constitution will allow. In attempting to construe
the “totality of the circumstances” the Court started its analysis by declaring
that “the interest in national security – is of the highest order of magnitude.”
To support this assertion, the Court cited a Supreme Court case which
upheld a decision by the Secretary of State to revoke a citizen’s passport on
the ground that the holder's activities in foreign countries are causing or are
likely to cause serious damage to the national security or foreign policy of the
United States. It is beyond my understanding how dicta from this case,
which involves one American who is suspected of wrongdoing, has any
relevance in upholding the constitutionality of legislation which permits the
surveillance of thousands or even millions of Americans. The infringement
on personal liberty based on the suspected wrongdoing of a specific individual
is very different than infringing on the privacy rights of all U.S. persons who
communicate to non-U.S. persons located abroad. Since the Supreme Court
has never analyzed the issue directly, nor has pronounced a foreign
intelligence exception to the Warrant Clause, it is unclear whether they
would agree with the reasoning of the FISC’s latest decision. In re Sealed
Case, No. 08-01 (FISA Ct. Rev. Aug. 22, 2008).

2010]

MONITORING INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS 19

III. INTERNATIONAL LAW REGARDING GOVERNMENTAL
SURVEILLANCE OF COMMUNICATION
A.

Sources of International Law: Treaties and Custom

International law stems from a number of sources. The
first step to resolving any international law question starts
with consulting relevant treaties or binding resolutions. 76 In
the event that such documents are not directly on point to the
issue, one should next consider the role of international
custom. 77 Lastly, judicial decisions may be consulted, because
while they are not a direct source of international law, they can
be helpful because such decisions reflect customary
international law. 78
The right to privacy is a well-recognized, “fundamental,
though not absolute, human right.” 79 Numerous international
treaties establish that citizens are entitled a right to privacy in
their communications. Beginning with Article 12 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which has
been coined as “the modern privacy benchmark at an
international level,” 80 there is language which states that “[n]o
one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his . . .
correspondence . . . . Everyone has the right to the protection
of the law against such interference or attacks.” 81 In addition,
Article 12 of the American Convention on Human Rights and
Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) incorporate similar language. According to
Professor Charles H.B. Garraway, the key word is “arbitrary,”
meaning that “[t]argeted interference with the right to privacy
in accordance with domestic law would not seem to run afoul of
ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 26 (2003).
Id.
78 Id. at 37.
79 David Banisar & Simon Davies, Global Trends in Privacy Protection:
An International Survey of Privacy, Data Protection, and Surveillance Laws
and Developments, 18 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1, 8 (1999); see
also Charles H.B. Garraway, State Intelligence Gathering: Conflict of Laws,
28 MICH. J. INT’L L. 575, 579 (2007).
80 Banisar & Davies, supra note 79, at 8.
81 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res.217A, at 12, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
76
77
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the human rights provision . . . although the targeting will
need to be carefully designated so that it does not violate the
prohibition against discrimination.” 82
The United States is not a signatory of the UDHR, nor did
it ratify the American Convention on Human Rights. And
while the United States finally did ratify the ICCPR in 1992, it
did so with an express declaration that “the provisions of
Article 1 through 27 of the Covenant are not self-executing,” 83
and went on to state that the declaration was meant to “clarify
that the Covenant will not create a private cause of action in
U.S. Courts.” 84 Therefore, none of these provisions can be used
to strike down the FAA as a violation of a treaty of the United
States.
While it can be said that most nations recognize the right
of privacy of their citizens, there are no international treaties
that deal directly with international surveillance standards. 85
Accordingly, we must look to international custom to determine
whether there is a rule of law that has developed from the
“general and consistent practice of states.” 86 Because virtually
every nation conducts surveillance and intelligence
gathering, 87 it is difficult to reconcile the individual privacy
rights guaranteed to citizens who live in a country that ratified
one of the above international treaties with international
custom, which has historically tolerated surveillance by the
State.
B. Liberty v. United Kingdom: Balancing between Individual
Privacy and National Security
The recent European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
Garraway, supra note 79, at 581.
HENRY J. STEINER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT
1142 (2007).
84 Id.
85 A. John Radsan, The Unresolved Equation of Espionage and
International Law, 28 MICH. J. INT’L L. 595, 597 (2007).
86 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. §
102 (1987).
87 Jeffrey H. Smith, State Intelligence Gathering and International Law:
Keynote Address, 28 MICH. J. INT’L L. 543, 544 (2007); Glen Sulmasy & John
Yoo, Counterintuitive: Intelligence Operations and International Law, 28
MICH. J. INT’L L. 625, 637 (2007).
82
83
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decision, Liberty v. United Kingdom, suggests that
international custom regarding surveillance is changing, as
judicial decisions can be helpful in determining customary
The international treaty directly
international law. 88
implicated by this lawsuit is the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(ECHR). Article 8 of the ECHR provides:
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family
life, his home and his correspondence.
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with
the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with
the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of national security, public safety or the economic
well-being of a country, for the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of
the rights and freedoms of others. 89

This freedom to communicate without governmental
interference is protected in the European Union as a human
right, specifically “Article 8 of the ECHR establishes privacy in
one’s communications as a qualified, fundamental right.” 90
Although the European Court of Human Rights has interpreted
Article 8 to strictly prohibit the arbitrary interception of
international surveillance data, in the interests of national
security, Article 8's protections are not absolute.
During the 1990’s the United Kingdom’s Ministry of
Defense operated an Electronic Test Facility that was capable
of intercepting 10,000 simultaneous telephone calls, e-mails
and faxes from Dublin to London and on to Continental
Europe. 91 The United Kingdom’s surveillance law at the time
was The Interception of Communications Act 1985 (ICA), 92
which allowed for the interception of communications pursuant
to a warrant. The warrants only allowed the government to
CASSESE, supra note 76, at 37.
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 230.
90 Alexander Diaz Morgan, A Broadened View of Privacy as a Check
Against Government Access to E-Mail in the United States and the United
Kingdom, 40 NYU J. INT’L L. & POL. 803, 817 (2008).
91 Liberty v. United Kingdom, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. 58243/00, 2.
92 The Interception of Communications Act 1985, c. 56 § 1, (Eng.).
88
89
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physically intercept communications, not read them or listen to
them.
The “warrants covered very broad classes of
communications, for example, ‘all commercial submarine cables
having one terminal in the UK and carrying external
communications to Europe’, and all communications falling
within the specified category would be physically
intercepted.” 93 While it was necessary for the UK Government
to obtain a warrant in order to intercept communications,
“[t]he legal discretion granted to the executive for the physical
capture of external communications was . . . virtually
unfettered.” 94
After obtaining the warrant, the Secretary of State was
required to issue a certificate describing the classes of
communications that could be “extracted from the total volume
of communications intercepted under a particular warrant.” 95
The certificates did not need to specify the targets of
surveillance, but rather just label the categories as either
relating to “national security,” “preventing or detecting serious
crime,” or “safeguarding the economic well-being of the United
Kingdom.” 96 “National security” meant any activities “which
threaten the safety or well-being of the State, and which are
intended to undermine or overthrow Parliamentary democracy
by political, industrial or violent means.” 97 In determining
whether a warrant should be issued for such surveillance, the
ICA required the Secretary of State to find that a warrant was
necessary because the information could not reasonably be
acquired through other investigative methods. 98 These two
steps formed a “certified warrant.” 99 After the “certified
warrant” was issued, the judiciary’s role in the process ended,
and it was up to the state officials to come up with keyword
search terms so that an automated search engine could filter
The ICA required the
the intelligence data collected. 100
Liberty, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. 58243/00, 12.
Id. at 18.
95 Id. at 12.
96 Id.
97 Liberty, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 5 (citing 1986 Report of the
Commissioner).
98 The Interception of Communications Act 1985, c. 56 § 2(3) (Eng.).
99 Liberty, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R.at 12.
100 Id.
93
94
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executive to create rules designed to promote the “minimisation
of the interference with privacy.” 101
Despite the minimization procedures, however, Liberty (a
British civil liberties’ organization based in London), British
Irish Rights Watch, and the Irish Council for Civil Liberties
(both Irish civil liberties’ organizations based in Dublin)
commenced a lawsuit against the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, claiming that the government
infringed upon their privacy rights by physically intercepting
virtually
all
international
communications,
including
applicant’s privileged and confidential communications. 102
The applicants argued to the Court that the Government’s
interception of private communications was not proportionate
to any legitimate aim of protecting national security, since “the
1895 Act permitted interception of large classes of
communications for any purpose, and it was only subsequently
that this material was sifted to determine whether it fell
within the scope of a [certified] warrant.” 103 The Government
submitted that “in principle, any person who sent or received
any form of telecommunication outside the British Islands
during the period in question could have had such a
communication physically intercepted” under such a
warrant. 104 The Government said that in the interest of
national security, it could not disclose how it filtered the
physically intercepted data as “[i]t would enable individuals to
adapt their conduct so as to minimize the effectiveness of any
interception methods which it might be thought necessary to
apply to them.” 105 However, the Government urged the Court
to trust that the Government had safeguards in place to ensure
that communications were not surveilled arbitrarily. 106
The European Court of Human Rights was unconvinced by
the government’s promise to conduct surveillance in a manner

Id. at 13.
Id. at 12. Applicants were lawyers who were in regular contact with
clients abroad and provided legal advice through electronic means.
103 Liberty, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 13.
104 Id. at 14.
105 Id.
106 Id.
101
102
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that was “in accordance with the law” 107 and held that there
was an actionable interference by the government’s data
mining practice. The ECtHR stated that, “the mere existence
of legislation which allows a system for the secret monitoring of
communications entails a threat of surveillance for all those to
whom the legislation may be applied;” 108 therefore, the UK’s
surveillance program amounted to an “interference with the
exercise of the applicants’ rights under Article 8, irrespective of
any measures actually taken against them.” 109
The ECtHR next stated that the interference in privacy
was justified because the surveillance was necessary in the
interest of national security; the only question that remained
before the Court, therefore, is whether the government’s
interception of private communications was in “accordance
with the law.” 110 The ECtHR held that in order for an
international surveillance program be in accordance with the
law, it is “essential to have clear, detailed rules on interception
of telephone conversations . . . [so that it] give[s] citizens an
adequate indication as to the circumstances in which and the
conditions on which public authorities are empowered to resort
The Court described certain
to any such measures.” 111
“minimum safeguards” that must be explicitly spelled out in
any international surveillance statute in order to be in
“accordance with the law.” These safeguards included:
(1) the nature of the offences which may give rise to an
interception order;
(2) a definition of the categories of people liable to have their
telephones tapped;
(3) a limit on the duration of telephone tapping;
(4) the procedure to be followed for examining, using and
storing the data obtained;
(5) the precautions to be taken when communicating the data
to other parties; and

107
108
109
110
111

Liberty, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 20.
Id. at 16.
Id.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 18.
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(6) the circumstances in which recordings may or must be
erased or the tapes destroyed. 112

The ECtHR described the government’s authority to
intercept data under the Interception of Communications Act
1985 as “virtually unfettered,” 113 and therefore held that the
ICA was in violation of Article 8 of the ECHR. To remedy this
intrusion into private communications, the Court declared that
“[e]veryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the]
Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a
national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been
committed by persons acting in an official capacity.” 114
C. The European Court of Human Rights Would Declare the
FAA Unlawful
In light of Liberty v. United Kingdom, if one were to
hypothetically challenge the FAA in the European Court of
Human Rights, it is unlikely that the Court would uphold the
FAA as a lawful surveillance program because the scope of
authority granted to the intelligence agencies to intercept and
examine private communications is close to limitless.
Moreover, the law does not clearly state how data mining will
be conducted in order to prevent abuse of power by the
executive branch. In addition, because there is no public
disclosure about the minimization procedures that the
intelligence agencies are required to follow, there is no way for
the public to know whether their conversations are likely to be
the subject of such an invasion..
Like the plaintiffs in Amnesty v. McConnell, the plaintiffs
in the ECtHR lawsuit were civil rights activist organizations
who claimed that the government infringed upon the privacy
rights of all citizens through their surveillance program, which
had the effect of physically intercepting almost all
international communications. The plaintiffs claimed, similar

Liberty, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 18.
Id.
114 Id. at 20. It is interesting to note that the remedy created by the
Court’s holding in Liberty is in direct conflict with the retroactivity immunity
that the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 grants telecommunication providers.
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, supra note 5, § 801.
112
113
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to the ACLU, that the government’s intrusion into the privacy
of all citizens was not proportionate to the goal of national
security.
Liberty sets out a two-prong test in order to determine
whether surveillance which interferes with the private
communications of citizens is in “accordance with the law.”
Accordingly, surveillance must be foreseeable, meaning that a
surveillance statute must provide clear, detailed rules about
surveillance procedures so that it gives citizens an indication
as to the circumstances in which their conversations will be
monitored; such procedures must comply with certain
minimum safeguards.
1)

Foreseeability

The ECtHR struck down the Interception of
Communications Act 1985, even though surveillance was
conducted pursuant to a warrant, because the judicially issued
warrants were so vague and all-encompassing that, in the eyes
of the ECtHR, they granted too much discretion to intercept
and dissect private communications. The ECtHR found that
the ICA failed to prevent an abuse of power by the state and
failed to allow citizens the opportunity to know when their
communications would be subject to a search. The ICA did not
require the intelligence agencies to specify the particular
individuals or places to be targeted, but rather warrants would
be granted if an executive official certified that such
surveillance related to national security, and that such
surveillance was necessary because the information could not
reasonably be acquired through other means.
Similarly, under the FAA, the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court will issue a warrant for surveillance as long
as the Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence
certify that a significant purpose of the acquisition is to obtain
foreign intelligence information. Other than the requirement
that officials cannot intentionally target U.S. persons, there is
no requirement that the surveillance be targeted at any specific
person or place. Accordingly, nothing in the FAA prevents the
government from abusing its power in conducting surveillance
for purposes other than preventing terrorism. The executive
branch is given broad discretion to monitor international
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communications, so long as the ascertaining of foreign
intelligence information is a significant purpose of the
surveillance.
Theoretically, when the two statutes are compared, the
FAA allows for even more interception of international
communications, as there is no requirement that the United
States government certify that such surveillance is necessary.
Perhaps this means that the government can:
[E]ngage in the wholesale collection of Americans’
international communications . . . for example, knowingly
and intentionally collect all communications between the
New York and London offices of Amnesty International . . .
Indeed, under the FAA the government can obtain all
communications between New York and London so long as
the ostensible targets for this mass acquisition are non-U.S.
persons believed to be in the United Kingdom. 115

By giving the government such broad discretion, there is no
way for Americans to adjust their behavior so that they are not
the subject of surveillance, other than perhaps deciding to
never speak to any non-U.S. person abroad through the use of
electronic communication equipment. It is highly unlikely that
the ECtHR would uphold a surveillance program as expansive
as the FAA, because the FAA grants the United States federal
government the authority to intercept, inspect and store all
international conversations that occur through electronic
means, without a showing that such surveillance is necessary
in the interests of national security. In addition to employing
dragnet surveillance tactics, a surveillance program similar to
the FAA would not pass muster in the ECtHR as it does not
adequately put citizens on notice that their communications
are being monitored.
The government in the ACLU case urges the Court to
assume that the Executive Branch will abide by the regulations
set forth in the FAA in order to comply with its prohibition
against reverse-targeting and have in place certain
minimization procedures designed to protect the privacy of U.S.
persons whose communications are intercepted incidentally.
115 Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment,
supra note 39, at 39 (emphasis added).
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When the UK government attempted this “just trust us”
argument, the ECtHR was unconvinced that such a large
degree of executive discretion would result in non-arbitrary
intrusion into communications. In this vein, and remembering
what the Keith court said about the nature of the executive
branch, the court in Amnesty v. McConnell should be very
hesitant to defer to the executive branch such a degree of
unregulated discretion without judicial oversight.
2.

Minimum Safeguards

The FAA fails under the minimum safeguards analysis of
Liberty as well.
The ECtHR specifically held that any
surveillance statute must specifically state the “nature of the
offense” which gives rise to an interception order, however, the
FAA does not require the government to believe that the target
of surveillance is related even remotely to criminal or terrorist
activities. If the target of the surveillance is an unknown
foreign agent, who intelligence agencies have no reason to
believe is engaged in criminal or terrorist activities, what is the
nature of the “offense” in such a situation? Surely, U.S.
persons engaging in communications with non-U.S. persons
cannot be an “offense.”
The ECHR would also require a surveillance statute to
explicitly state the categories of people liable to have their
telephone lines tapped, which may mean people who
communicate with known or suspected terrorists. No such
showing of suspicion of wrongdoing, however, is required under
the FAA.
The intelligence agencies can intercept all
communications between U.S. persons and non-U.S. persons;
the FAA makes no other limitations.
Under the Liberty guidelines, minimization procedures
should be explicitly laid out in the statute so that the
authorities cannot intrude into the private conversations
among people in a way that is discriminatory or arbitrary. The
FAA, however, fails to specify the details of the minimization
procedures which the intelligence agencies are required to
adopt. Lastly, because there are no guidelines on when
recordings must be erased or destroyed, and there is nothing
preventing the government from compiling all the intelligence
data collected under this surveillance program into searchable
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databases, the FAA would fail under the Liberty safeguard
analysis.
CONCLUSION
Because terrorism is a global problem, all nations around
the world are confronted with having to balance the privacy
rights of their citizens versus the pressing need of all
governments to secure the national defense of their country. In
assessing the United States’ current surveillance practices, it is
beneficial to be aware of how other nations have struck the
balance between individual liberty and national security, as
that may impact one’s conclusion of whether or not the FAA is
reasonable. In the end, however, the question is ultimately one
of Fourth Amendment constitutional analysis. Although the
future of privacy rights in this country is not clear, there is
good reason to believe that should the Supreme Court hear
Amnesty v. McConnell, the Court will strike down the FAA as
unconstitutional.

